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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the optimal investment conditions for switching the Edvard Grieg field 
from traditional power generation methods (gas turbines) to electrical power from shore. By 
interpreting this problem as a cost-minimization problem, the wholesale electricity price is the 
main stochastic element. A discrete dynamic programming model, implementing backward 
recursion, is implemented to find the threshold wholesale electricity prices for choosing 
between gas turbines and PFS. Additionally, different future carbon prices and their effects on 
the threshold price are examined, given the criticality of carbon prices for the gas turbine 
solution’s costs.   
Upon running the dynamic programming model, the baseline model yielded a threshold 
wholesale electricity price of 295 NOK/MWh. This indicates that PFS would be the optimal 
choice when the wholesale electricity price is at or below 295 NOK/MWh. Upon completing 
a sensitivity analysis for the oil price and OPEX parameters, it is found that the threshold 
electricity price does not change, only the project value range changes. Thereafter, a 10% and 
25% increase in the carbon emission tax is examined. A 10% increase in the carbon tax price 
yields a threshold electricity price of 320 NOK/MWh, while a 25% increase yields 360 
NOK/MWh. Lastly, the critical carbon price was found to be 1003 NOK/ton, representing the 
level of carbon tax necessary to negate the gas turbine option.  
This thesis finds the PFS solution economically viable in some cases, illustrating different 
levels of threshold electricity prices given the current environment. However, there are more 
concerns against PFS than just economic ones, such as electricity import, export of emissions, 
etc. Decisions concerning the fate of PFS at the Edvard Grieg platform are in discussion now, 
but it could be years before a final decision is made.  
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1. Introduction 
Despite Norway’s efforts to be a world leader in sustainability and environmental policy, it is 
difficult to ignore that the largest part of Norway’s modern economy and society is its booming 
oil and gas industry. In an effort to try and clean up one of the world’s “dirtiest” industries, 
for years the Norwegian government has promoted the use of a new power generation solution 
for its offshore platforms: electrical power from shore, and there is no greater goal than to 
completely electrify the area known as the Utsira High, home to the Edvard Grieg, Ivar Åsen, 
and giant Johan Sverdrup fields. The electrification of this area could lead to a savings of more 
than a million tons of CO2 emissions per year; however, power from shore comes at a high 
cost that the operators do not want to pay. 
Before Johan Sverdrup was found, it was determined that it would not be economical for 
Edvard Grieg (who supplies Ivar Åsen with electrical power) alone to implement power from 
shore (hereafter, PFS), so a traditional gas turbine power solution was planned and 
implemented. Yet, after Johan Sverdrup and its enormous reserves were found, there seemed 
to be hope once again for a PFS solution. Edvard Grieg operator Lundin now stands at a fork 
in the road; once Johan Sverdrup is up and running, should Edvard Grieg connect to that 
platform and receive electrical power, or should it continue with the originally planned gas 
turbine generators?  
Currently, there is large debate between the Norwegian government and the oil operators as to 
whether this PFS solution can actually be implemented for the Utsira High. Given that a major 
cost differential between the PFS and gas turbine solution is the cost of the electricity needed; 
this thesis aims to the approximate threshold electricity prices for which PFS can be 
implemented at Edvard Grieg. Furthermore, special attention will be given to identifying the 
effect of the Norwegian and European carbon taxes on the viability of a PFS versus a gas 
turbine solution for the Edvard Grieg field.  
This thesis is split into four different parts. First, there is an in-depth look at the context of this 
problem, including the Norwegian petroleum industry and its contributions to Norwegian 
emissions, Norwegian power markets, and the specific case field, Edvard Grieg. Thereafter, 
the problem is narrowly defined and the chosen theory to evaluate the problem is introduced 
and elaborated on. Next, the results from the chosen methodology are presented, and lastly, 
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the results are discussed in the context of the current environment, both economically and 
politically.  
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2. Background 
2.1 Petroleum Industry in Norway  
2.1.1 Overview 
Since the beginning of oil production on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in the early 1970s, 
the petroleum industry has played a major role in the development of Norway as a whole. The 
NCS currently has more than 70 fields in operation, producing approximately 1.9 million 
barrels of oil  and 111 billion Sm3 of natural gas per day in 2012 (Oljedirektoratet, 2013). This 
put Norway as the seventh largest oil exporter and fourteenth largest oil producer as well as 
the third largest gas exporter and sixth largest gas producer in the world (Oljedirektoratet, 
2013).  
The revenues received from petroleum activities have been a crucial part in financing the 
Norwegian welfare state, as well as contributing to the economy’s financial growth over the 
last decades. Since the first field started producing in 1971, production on the NCS has 
contributed more than NOK 9000 billion to the country’s GDP and comprised more than 23 
percent of the country’s total value creation in 2012 (Oljedirektoratet, 2013). Not only does 
the industry contribute financially, but also socially, providing hundreds of thousands of jobs, 
both directly and indirectly.  
 
Figure 2-1: Macroeconomic indicators for the petroleum sector in 2012. 
Source: OIjedirektorat (2013).  
The petroleum industry’s impact on major parts of the Norwegian economy can be seen above 
in Figure 2-1.  
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2.1.2 Norwegian State in the Petroleum Industry  
Framework 
Since the beginning of oil production on the NCS, the Norwegian state has maintained a very 
involved role within the petroleum industry. The Norwegian parliament, the democratically 
elected legislative body, is at the head of the hierarchy for all decisions made surrounding the 
framework, operation and regulation of the industry. The parliament is responsible for 
deliberations on major development projects, financial/taxation systems and oversight of the 
industry as well as advisory to the Government and public offices (Oljedirektoratet, 2013). 
The parliament’s primary instrument for directing the industry is legislation, as well as 
considerable influence over the intermediary decision-makers. Within the parliament, there is 
the Energy and Environment committee, which handles all cases related to oil, gas, waterways, 
the environment and regional planning (Stortinget, 2013).  
Directly under the parliament is the Government. In this context, the Government refers to the 
“Council of State”. The council consists of the Prime Minister and heads of the various 
ministries. The Prime Minister is normally the leader of the coalition receiving/maintaining 
the majority in Storting after national elections every 4 years. Changes in the council can have 
significant consequences for the petroleum industry depending on the incoming coalition’s 
views on fossil fuel use and the environment. Primarily, the Government has “executive 
authority” over the petroleum industry through its various policies. This “executive authority” 
is divided among the different ministries, based on topic, as seen below in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1: Division of responsibilities among ministries. Source: 
Oljedirektoratet (2013).  
Ministry Responsibility 
- Petroleum and Energy  
Resource management and the sector as a 
whole  
- Labor 
Safety and working environment  
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- Finance 
Petroleum taxation 
- Fisheries and Coastal Affairs  
Oil spill preparedness  
- Health and Care Services  
Health issues  
- Environment 
External environment  
 
Lastly, under the different ministries, there are also a wide spectrum of public agencies, the 
most prominent being the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, which work in cooperation with 
the ministries to ensure the best possible framework and operation of the industry.  
In addition to the state’s role as legislator and regulator, the Norwegian state is also an investor 
in petroleum activities on the NCS. The first role as investor is as the majority owner of Statoil 
Hydro ASA. Statoil was originally established as a state oil company by the parliament in 
1972, in order to ensure Norwegian participation on the NCS (Statoil, 2013). Then in 2001, 
the company was partially privatized and listed on the Oslo stock exchange, with the 
government retaining 81.7% of its shares. Since then, the government has gradually reduced 
its shareholding, to its current level of 67%. Because of its ownership in Statoil, the 
government receives yearly dividends based on the company’s performance. The second 
investor role held by the government is an arrangement called the State’s Direct Financial 
Interest (hereafter, SDFI). In this role, the state is an actual investor, similar to other oil and 
gas operators holding shares in projects, which they do not directly operate. SDFI began in 
1985 by splitting Statoil’s share in its NCS licenses in half and contributing one-half to the 
SDFI. As of January 2012, the SDFI portfolio consists of direct financial interests in 158 
production licenses and 15 joint ventures for pipelines and onshore facilities, with an 
approximate value of NOK 1.140 billion (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2012).  
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Revenues to the State  
As mentioned previously in Overview, the Norwegian state receives a large amount of money 
from the petroleum industry, mainly through the previously mentioned SDFI and the 
petroleum taxation system. The petroleum taxation system is based on two major arguments. 
The first argument is that the petroleum resources, in fact, belong to Norway, which should 
receive a sizeable portion of the created value from extraction. The second argument is that 
the petroleum tax will keep oil companies’ returns at an ordinary level (Oljedirektoratet, 2013). 
The petroleum tax system is split between 2 different rates, the standard corporate tax rate 
(28%) and the special petroleum tax rate (50%). The corporate tax rate base is the operator’s 
operating incomes less exploration and production-related expenses1. Additionally, there is a 
depreciation tax deduction, where the operator can deduct the full cost of its initial investments 
over the first six years. From the corporate tax base, there is an additional depreciation 
deduction, called “uplift”, which at 5.5% over four years (previously, 7.5%), is meant to ensure 
that normal returns are not subjected to the special tax rate. The special tax base is the corporate 
tax base less the uplift. In beginning years of a field, the tax base can be negative, in which 
case the excess uplift can be carried over to the next year.  
Alongside the SDFI and petroleum tax system, the state also receives revenues through area 
fees, environmental taxes and its stake in Statoil. Since 1990, all revenues the state receives 
from petroleum activities have been put into a separate, dedicated fund, the Government 
Pension Fund – Global, where it is managed by the Norges Bank Investment Management 
(hereafter, NBIM), on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, who decides on the investment 
strategy. The fund’s investment strategy is based on discussions in the parliament and with 
advisors in NBIM. Two distinct characteristics of the fund are, first, that it is invested entirely 
outside of Norway and second, that the fund follows ethical guidelines concerning the 
companies in which they will invest. As of 2014, the fund’s market value is approximately 
NOK 5 billion (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2014).  The main role of the 
Government Pension Fund – Global is to preserve the wealth from the petroleum industry for 
future generations of Norwegians.  
                                                 
1 Exploration and production-related expenses include all operating expenses, exploration expenses, research and 
development, decommissioning, CO2 and NOx taxes, area fees, etc.  
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2.1.3 Current State of the Industry 
After having reached at peak in the early 2000s, total petroleum production on the NCS has 
started to decline. Although Norway still maintains its spot as the seventh largest exporter of 
oil and second largest of gas in 2010, new areas for discoveries and new methods for extending 
production are being explored.  
New Exploration Areas  
The NPD Resource Report indicated that there are still substantial resources available on the 
NCS, in the Norwegian, North and South Barents Seas (2011). While the North Sea has been 
relatively well developed, with 54% of its recoverable petroleum resources sold and delivered, 
there is still great potential in the Norwegian Sea, only 29% and the especially the Barents 
Sea, only 1% (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2011). Many of the new finds on the NCS, 
for which operators have received licenses, are in challenging environments, from ultra-deep 
waters (>1500 meters) to difficult geological properties, and harsh conditions. These 
environments present a problem for operators to produce hydrocarbons in an economically 
feasible way, especially if the estimated reserves are of a small to medium quantity.  
In addition to the currently explored areas, there are other areas, such as the North Barents Sea 
and the Arctic Ocean, which hold much promise in terms of possible petroleum resources, but 
are not open for petroleum activities. As the parliament makes most major decisions 
concerning the operation of the industry, the only way for exploration to begin in these areas 
is by political decision. However, no new areas have been opened for oil and gas activities 
since 1994, which indicates a political environment that wants to limit petroleum activities 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2011). As mentioned above in Framework section, the 
coalition in charge of the government has the possibility to change every 4 years, meaning that 
there could be a shift in future policy regarding these unopened areas 
Existing Fields  
Many fields on the NCS are maturing and with that have had declining production. Declining 
production on oil and gas fields is a result of the pressure drop in the reservoir, which occurs 
when more and more hydrocarbons are extracted. The rate of decline is dependent on the 
individual reservoirs properties and the production rate of the facilities, decided by the 
operator. The NCS has some very large fields, like, Ekofisk, Statfjord, and Troll, which have 
been producing for a long time, but as Figure 2-2, below, shows, there will still be large 
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amounts of resources left behind, if the current plan is followed. Because of this, many players 
in the industry, operators, service providers, and the government, are continuously working 
on finding a way to increase recovery factors, both on individual fields and for the shelf as a 
whole.  
  
 
Figure 2-2: Distribution of produced oil, remaining oil reserves and oil 
resources, which will remain in the ground if fields follow the currently 
approved plans. Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2011).  
In 2010, the NCS had an average recovery factor of 49% for oil and 70% for gas, well above 
the international average of 22% (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2011). These recovery 
factors are bolstered by the very large fields like Ekofisk, Statfjord, and Oseberg, who have 
individual recovery factors of 49, 66 and 64%, respectively. The larger fields tend to have a 
higher recovery factor because they have very long production lifetimes and more flexibility, 
which allows the operator to implement different extended oil recovery (hereafter, EOR) 
techniques. The typical EOR methods employed on the NCS include mainly injection of 
different liquids or gases, such as polymers, surfactants, CO2, low-saline water, into the 
reservoir to increase the pressure. In order to inject the chosen substance, additional wells need 
to be drilled into the reservoir and large compressors and pumps need to be installed on the 
platform. All of these activities, especially the compressors and pumps, will require additional 
power, potentially significantly increasing the field’s total power requirement and and the 
field’s emissions.  
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2.1.4 Contribution to Norwegian Emissions  
Although the Norwegian petroleum industry is one of the largest contributors to the Norwegian 
economy, it is also one of the largest contributors to the country’s total greenhouse gas 
emissions. In 2012, the offshore petroleum industry contributed 12.4 million tons of carbon 
dioxide emissions, a slight increase over 2011 (Norwegian Oil and Gas Association, 2013). 
These emissions comprise roughly 28% of 
Norway’s total carbon emissions, second 
only to transportation (Statistics Norway, 
2013).  
Figure 2-3 depicts the breakdown of 
associated carbon emissions by source, 
indicating that the overwhelming majority 
of petroleum-related carbon emissions are a 
result of the platform-based gas turbines 
used for power generation, contributing 
79.4% in 2012. The platform-based gas 
turbines are a standard method of power 
generation on offshore platforms because of 
its practicality and cost-effectiveness. Most 
oil fields have a sizeable amount of 
associated gas, meaning gas that is trapped in the oil that is extracted from the well. After the 
separation process, where the gas and other unwanted parts of the well stream are removed 
from the oil, there are limited options for the operator as to what to do with the gas. If there is 
export infrastructure, it can be exported, but if not, it can either be used in the turbines or 
burned as flare gas. Since the platform needs power as well, it is easiest for the operator to use 
the associated gas as fuel.  
Given the increased awareness and motivation to decrease overall greenhouse gas emissions, 
especially carbon dioxide emissions, the Norwegian government and several other industry 
and environmental agencies have investigated the different ways for the petroleum industry to 
decrease its carbon emissions. The main solutions supported by the parliament are carbon 
taxes on gas burned and the full or partial replacement of gas turbines by electrical power from 
shore.   
Figure 2-3: Petroleum 
production-related carbon 
emissions on the NCS. Source: 
Norwegian Oil and Gas 
Association (2013).   
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2.1.5 Power from Shore  
Although taxes on carbon emitted from offshore platforms can help mitigate emissions, the 
government-favored solution is supplying these platforms with power from the onshore grid. 
The power from shore (hereafter, PFS) solution can be either partial or full. A partial system 
would entail covering a portion of the platform’s power supply, with a supplemental gas 
turbine supplying the rest. This would decrease emissions based on the amount of power 
covered by electrical power. A full solution entails that the platform’s entire power 
requirement be covered by electrical power. In this case, the emissions savings are much 
greater. Collectively, PFS solutions could help significantly decrease the emissions of 
individual platforms, contributing to overall lower emissions on the NCS. The electricity is 
transported from the mainland Norwegian grid via a subsea power cable; alternating or direct 
current (hereafter AC and DC) depending on the distance from shore and power requirement. 
Since onshore power grids supply AC power, an AC PFS solution requires mainly the subsea 
cable and both onshore and offshore connection points. However, for distances further than 
100 kilometers, AC cables suffer from some technical transmission limitations (Chokhawala, 
2008). In the case of longer distances, a DC solution can be implemented. Due to onshore 
grids supplying AC power, a DC solution requires units on both the onshore and offshore ends 
to convert the power from AC to DC for transmission and then back for use on the platform 
(Chokhawala, 2008).  
Since 1996, the Norwegian government has required operators to investigate the use of PFS 
when examining all new developments (Meld.St.28, 2010-2011). Although PFS solutions 
have the ability to decrease emissions from the NCS, it is not used very often because of the 
high investment costs, due to the required infrastructure for DC solutions and very new 
technology as well as power availability onshore. When considering a PFS solution, the main 
cost drivers are the distance from shore as well as the required load. The distance from shore 
contains two major components, whether it is AC or DC power, and the length of the cable. 
As mentioned briefly above, an AC system requires fewer components than DC, meaning a 
lower investment. Additionally, the subsea cables, regardless of the current type, are priced by 
the meter. Longer cables will not only cost more, but will also require longer installation times, 
adding to the capital expenditure.  These concerns aside, there are some fields currently 
operating with a PFS solution, among which are Ormen Lange (A/S Norske Shell), Troll A 
(Statoil), and Valhall (BP). ABB, a Swedish power solutions manufacturer, asserts that the 
20 
best case, economically, for implementing PFS is in completely new developments and large-
scale renovations on major fields.   
Despite its potential positive environmental impact, there are some large challenges with large-
scale implementation of PFS on the NCS, namely, power availability. The amount of power 
platforms require is quite large, ranging from 15 to 200 MW and all of this power is supplied 
by the Norwegian grid, which is also responsible for the power demand on-shore 
(Chokhawala, 2008). Given increasing on-shore power demands, as well as, the possible 
implementation of PFS on the NCS, there is the potential for severe grid capacity issues, if no 
grid development occurs.  
2.2 Norwegian Power Grid and Power Markets  
2.2.1 Norwegian Power Grid  
A power grid is a critical piece of infrastructure in modern society, responsible for the transport 
of electricity from producers to consumers. One of the main requirements of a power grid is 
instantaneous balance, which entails a math between total generation and total consumption 
of power at all times (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013). In Norway, the 
electricity grid is divided into three different levels: main, regional and distribution/local. The 
different levels are divided based on both administrative and technical criterion. The main grid 
deals with the highest voltage power and constitutes the bulk of the transmission grid. Because 
of the high-voltage power, it is also responsible for international connectors. The regional grid 
transmits power throughout the country, serving as a connector between the main grid and the 
local/distribution grids, which primarily serves light industry and households with final 
distribution of low-voltage power.  
Within Norway, Statnett is the main transmission system operator (TSO) of the Norwegian 
power system, as well as the national main grid owner, responsible, not for the production of 
electricity, but the distribution to end consumers and maintenance of the instantaneous balance 
(Statnett, 2013). Additionally, Statnett controls decisions regarding the utilization of the 
current grid and new infrastructure.  
There are currently some major security of supply challenges in Norway, especially in Central 
and West Norway, where there are connections to offshore platforms. In Central Norway, the 
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Ormen Lange (both on- and off-shore) facilities require a large amount of power from the grid, 
which could jeopardize supply for commercial and residential power users. Additionally, in 
Western Norway, offshore projects, like Martin Linge, Troll A, and the subject of this thesis, 
the Utsira High, will put a large strain on the grid. Statnett, in its role as TSO and main grid 
owner, plans to increase grid capacity and strengthen transmission capabilities in order to meet 
these and other future grid challenges. According to the Statnett Grid Development Report, 
Statnett plans to spend roughly NOK 5-7 billion every year for the next ten years (2013).  
2.2.2 Power Markets  
The Norwegian grid is a part of the larger Nordic power market, comprised of Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Norway was 
the first Nordic power market to deregulate, 
serving as a catalyst for the rest of the Nordic 
countries, culminating in the formal 
establishment of Nord Pool Spot AS in 2002 
(Nord Pool Spot, 2013). Figure 2-4 illustrates 
the expansion of Nord Pool Spot to the Baltic 
states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well 
as further connection points to Russia, Poland, 
Germany and the Netherlands, encouraging 
further market integration with Europe. The 
major players in the power market are the 
power producers, power suppliers, brokers, 
energy companies and major consumers, who 
trade either on Nord Pool Spot, or bilaterally.  
In 2010, 74% of Nordic power generation was 
traded through Nord Pool Spot (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013). As 
mentioned above, the TSO is responsible for maintaining instantaneous balance within its area, 
and the Nordic power market is an excellent tool for the countries to trade power based on 
their shifting power demand and supply. This market is especially important for Norway, 
where 98% of electricity comes from hydropower, making Norwegian power supply highly 
dependent on annual rainfall, snow and other inflows to the reservoirs. The power market 
Figure 2-4: Nordic power 
market, Source: Nord Pool 
Spot (2013).  
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allows Norway to export power in especially “wet” years and import power in “dry” years, 
balancing out the previously extremely volatile electricity prices for Norwegian end-users.  
Prices on Nord Pool Spot are calculated the day before for each hour of the coming day, with 
prices for each of the regions as well as the system price. The system price is representative 
of overall generation and consumption conditions at the given hour, as seen below in Figure 
2-5. In Figure 2-5, part of the supply curve dips under the x-axis, indicating negative prices. 
Negative prices are possible on the wholesale power market, due to high inflexible power 
generation and low power demand. If the power generation cannot be shut down and/or 
restarted in a cost-efficient manner, then producers could decide to sell their energy at a 
negative price. Additionally, the right-hand side of the supply curve is quite steep. This can be 
attributed to the marginal cost of different power generation methods. The increase occurs at 
high quantity (x-axis) because the cheapest power generation method will be used to its full 
capacity, in which case, then increasingly more expensive generation methods are used for 
surplus demand. Norwegian prices are mainly determined by the market conditions in the 
Nordic market, however there is some effect from market developments outside the Nordic 
region.  
Very large power users, like oil and gas operators, tend to purchase their electricity from the 
wholesale market. One such operator, with much experience with PFS, is Norske Shell, who 
claimed that they operate an electricicty portfolio comprised of mainly spot positions and a 
Figure 2-5: Nord Pool Spot system price formation. The system price 
arises at the market equilibrium, where the demand and supply curve 
intersect. Source: Nord Pool Spot (2013).  
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few longer term contracts. In this case, however, none of the contracts lasted for longer than 
five years.   
2.3 Current Carbon Taxes  
For oil and gas operators on the NCS, there are two major taxes for the emissions originating 
at their platforms: first, the Norwegian carbon tax and second, the European Union Emission 
Trading System (hereafter, ETS).  
2.3.1 Norwegian Carbon Tax  
The Norwegian government levies a tax on each ton of CO2 emitted on the NCS from offshore 
oil and gas installations. Up to 2013, the tax amounted to 210 NOK/ton CO2 emitted, however 
in 2013, the government decided to almost double the tax, putting the rate at 410 NOK/ton 
(Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013). This new carbon tax gives Norway one 
of the strictest policies against carbon emissions in the world, especially when looking at 
taxation on industry.  
2.3.2 European Union Emission Trading System 
 The EU ETS is the world’s largest emissions trading system, spanning over 31 countries, the 
28 EU member states, plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. The ETS follows a “cap and 
trade” principle (European Commission, 2014). The main intuition behind the system is that 
the carbon emitters will receive permits for their given amount of allowed emissions. The total 
number of permits is the maximum amount of emissions allowed. Thereafter, the emitters are 
allowed to trade the permits as needed. Gradually, the cap or maximum amount of permits 
will be reduced in order to reduce the total amount of CO2 emissions. The system was rolled 
out in 2005 as the cornerstone in the EU’s climate policy. The system covers all factories, 
power stations and other installations with a net heat excess of 20 MW (European 
Commission, 2014). Also included in this broad definition are aviation operators who fly 
within or between most of the member countries. In total, approximately 45% of all EU 
emissions are controlled by the EU ETS (European Commission, 2014).  
Upon its launch, the EU ETS was split up into three different phases:  
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 2005 – 2007: First Trading Period – This was the establishment of the system and the 
“learning period”.  
 2008 – 2012. Second Trading Period – In this period, three extra countries joined the 
system (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and the number of allowances was 
reduced by 6.5%. 
 2013 – 2020: Third Trading Period – In this period, a major reform takes effect with 
an EU-wide cap on emissions to be reduced yearly. 
Despite the planning, there have been many problems with the launch and operation of the 
system, which have limited the effectiveness of the system. First, the initial permits were 
allocated under the “grandfathering” system (European Commission, 2014). That means that 
permits would be allocated based on previous emissions. In this case, many participants 
increased their emissions in the years leading up to the ETS launch, in order to acquire as 
many permits as possible under the new system. Additionally, the financial crisis in Europe 
caused a decrease in demand as well as emissions, which led to an oversupply of carbon 
permits in the market. As of the start of Phase 3 in 2013, there was a surplus of approximately 
2.1 billion carbon permits in the market (European Commission, 2014). These shortcomings 
have suppressed the carbon permit price, forcing the European Commission to take action in 
order to increase the effectiveness of the carbon permit market. The most notable action came 
in February 2014, where the European Commission voted to enact “backloading” measures 
(Garside, 2014). This law will enable the European Commission to freeze the auction sale of 
some carbon permits, up to 900 million until 2019-2020, thereby decreasing the supply in the 
market place and hopefully, placing upward pressure on the price. In addition, the maximum 
amount of carbon permits to be withdrawn from the market is increased from 300 million to 
400 million permits. These actions seek to increase the price and suppress the supply of the 
permits until demand can pick up again.  
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2.4 Selected Case: Edvard Grieg Field 
2.4.1 Area Description  
After winning the production 
license PL338, Lundin 
petroleum discovered the 
Edvard Grieg field while drilling 
in block 16/1 in 2007. This area 
is situated off the west coast of 
Norway, 180 kilometers west of 
the city of Stavanger. The field 
sits on the Utsira High 
geological formation, at a depth 
of 109 meters. The Edvard Grieg 
reservoir is made up of alluvial, 
eolian and shallow marine 
conglomerates and sandstones 
from the Triassic to Lower 
Cretaceous ages and is located at 
a depth of approximately 1,900 
meters (Lundin Petroleum, 
2013). The estimated reserves at 
the field are 26.2 million Sm3 of 
oil and 1.8 billion Sm3 of natural 
gas, with an additional 0.6 
million tons NGL (Oljedirektoratet, 2013). The geological make-up of the reservoir has 
excellent properties for extraction and Lundin predicts a recovery rate of more than 50% 
(2013).   
The discovery of the Edvard Grieg field spurred the further exploration of the area, leading to 
the finds of other fields, among which are Apollo, Luno South, Luno II and the exceptionally 
large Johan Sverdrup field, the fifth largest find on the Norwegian Continental Shelf to date 
(Lundin Petroleum , 2013). Other fields in the area are Ivar Åsen, which will be connected to 
the Edvard Grieg field and Gina Krog. Edvard Grieg, Ivar Åsen, Johan Sverdrup, and Gina 
Figure 2-6: License Map of the Edvard 
Grieg, Ivar Åsen, Johan Sverdrup and 
Gina Krog fields. The green shading 
indicates an oil field, red gas fields, and 
red and green mixed oil and gas fields. 
Source: Oljedirektoratet (2013).  
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Krog (labelled on the map as 16/4-6) and their general proximity to each other can be seen 
above in Figure 2-6. In Figure 2-6, the Edvard Grieg field is labelled to the left of the Johan 
Sverdrup Field. The map does not mark that Johan Sverdrup is comprised, of not only block 
16/2-6, but also 16/2-3, 16/2-4 and 16/2-5. In addition to Edvard Grieg, Lundin has operator 
rights on Johan Sverdrup as well, with other operators/license holders in the area being OMV 
Norge (Edvard Grieg), Wintershall Norge AS (Edvard Grieg), Det Norske Oljeselskapet (Ivar 
Åsen), and Statoil (Johan Sverdrup/Gina Krog) (Oljedirektoratet, 2013).  
2.4.2 Field Development  
Lundin submitted its plan for development and operation (hereafter, PDO) to the parliament 
in the first quarter of 2012. Since 1996, the parliament has required that every new field 
development consider a power from shore solution in their PDO, in order to encourage PFS 
and reduce future carbon emissions on the NCS (Oljedirektoratet, 2013). Since Edvard Grieg 
and Ivar Åsen were found in the same time span, a joint PFS solution was investigated but 
ultimately, found to be uneconomic. However, with the discovery of the large Johan Sverdrup 
field in 2010, a PFS solution for the entire area could be realized. An investigation into PFS 
solutions for the entire Utsira High southern region (Edvard Grieg, Ivar Åsen, Johan Sverdrup 
and Gina Krog) is underway by Statoil, but since both Edvard Grieg and Ivar Åsen are planned 
to come on-stream in late 2015-2016, the two fields need a power generation solution for the 
pre-Johan Sverdrup years. Edvard Grieg is planned to be the “field center”, taking care of the 
bulk of processing and export of the extracted hydrocarbons from both fields. Additionally, 
the Ivar Åsen field will be electrified from the start, receiving power via a subsea AC cable 
from Edvard Grieg (Det norske oljeselskapet, 2013). The subsea cable and oil lines between 
the two facilities can be seen below in Figure 2-7.  
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In order to power both Ivar Åsen and its own platform before Johan Sverdrup, Edvard Grieg 
will be powered initially by two 30MW GE LM2500+ gas turbines to power both platforms 
(add energy, 2012). However, the PDO detailing this solution was accepted by the parliament, 
contingent on the capability of connecting to a communal electrified power source once it 
becomes available (Prop.88 S, 2011-2012).  Lundin has managed this by installing a hook-up 
point on the platform for a future AC power cable.  
2.4.3 Current Controversy over Utsira High Electrification  
As discussed above, given the discovery of Johan Sverdrup, the parliament approved the PDO 
(with gas turbines) for Edvard Grieg, contingent on the eventual switch to power from shore 
once Johan Sverdrup came on-stream. This entire arrangement, in turn, is dependent on Johan 
Sverdrup receiving enough power to cover the needs of all the platforms or on a separate power 
hub platform to power all the platforms in the area2. However, on February 13, 2014, Statoil, 
in charge of the design and development plans for Johan Sverdrup, revealed the phase one 
concept selection for the Johan Sverdrup development, including a PFS solution, but only for 
                                                 
2 The power hub platform is a current project undertaken by Statoil called the Utsira High Power Hub Project, which consists 
of an on-shore substation convertor at Kårstø, with a DC subsea cable to an offshore hub platform convertor. The newly AC 
electricity would then be transported to the surrounding platforms (Johan Sverdrup, Edvard Grieg, and Gina Krog) via AC 
subsea cables.  
Figure 2-7: Planned development of the Ivar 
Åsen (left) and Edvard Grieg (right) fields. 
Source: Det norske Oljeselskapet (2013).  
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Johan Sverdrup. Now there is a large debate both between the government and the parliament 
and between the state and the operators over whether (or not) the entire Utsira High area will 
be electrified, as previously believed.   
Statoil, along with the operators and license-holders in the area, claims that the estimated 
capital expenditures for a full-area electrification solution have increased from approximately 
NOK 9 billion in December 2012 to over NOK 16 billion in December 2013 (Taraldsen, Her 
er Tord Leins forklaring på at Utsira-prisen gikk fra 9 til 16 mrd. på ett år, 2014). The NOK 7 
billion increase comes from a variety of different factors both in the project and external that 
have changed over the last year. Internally, there have been varying estimates of the power 
requirement for the entire solution, from 250 MW initially, to 300 MW in summer 2013 and 
then 190 MW, more recently. Externally, the operators have made claims that major projects 
in the offshore wind industry in Europe is dominating the supplier industry, creating 
bottlenecks, as well as increasing prices and lead times. However, this argument has received 
strong criticism from NORWEA, the interest group for wind power in Norway, stating that it 
is unlikely that wind projects require so much installation capacity that it would affect the 
Utsira High project (Taraldsen, "Vennligst ikke forsøk å skylde på oss. Vennlig hilsen 
vinnkraften", 2014).  It is also worth mentioning that most of the reports made by both the 
OED and media outlets are based primarily on data from Statoil.  
Arguments and criticism aside, electrification of the Utsira High is primarily a political issue 
that the parliament strongly supports. Considering that operators must submit and receive 
approval on a PDO detailing development and operation plans to Storting, it is most likely the 
case that the Utsira High will receive a full electrification solution, based on requirement from 
the parliament, which serves as a main assumption for this thesis.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Problem Formulation 
The optimal investment condition problem centers on a switch option for the Edvard Grieg 
field, either to maintain its current power generation solution (gas-powered turbines) or to 
switch to a PFS solution from Johan Sverdrup. The real options technique chosen to investigate 
this problem is discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming. The structure of the analysis 
is as follows: 
 determination of the appropriate stochastic price process, 
 estimation of parameters based on historical data, 
 definition of the profit function of the two power generation solutions,  
 dynamic optimization of the solutions’ expected net present values, through the real 
option approach, to identify the optimal conditions for investment. 
In this thesis, “optimal conditions” will be characterized by threshold wholesale electricity 
prices, which will serve as the thresholds to indicate the optimal action of when to switch 
power generation solutions or not. Additionally, the results through real option analysis will 
be modified to explore the effect of the total carbon price on the threshold electricity prices 
and to find the critical carbon price, the price at which the gas turbine power generation 
solution is not viable.   
3.2 Real Option Overview 
Real option valuation is based on the logic of financial options, that a manager has the right 
but not the obligation to make certain investment. Before moving to real options, first the logic 
of financial options must be reviewed. According to Hull (2009), a financial option is a 
contract that gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying 
asset at a pre-determined price. The option itself has four important characteristics. First, there 
is the type of option, either a call or a put. A call option is the option to buy the underlying 
asset and a put option is to sell the underlying asset. Second, there is the time horizon or 
maturity, meaning the length of the time the option lasts before it expires. Third, is the exercise 
style. There is a wide variety of different exercise styles available, but the most common are 
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European and American options. A European option can be exercised only at maturity, while 
an American option can be exercised at any time leading up to and at maturity. Lastly, is the 
pre-determined price of the underlying asset, referred to as the strike price. As mentioned 
previously, the option holder is not obligated to exercise the option, so if current prices at the 
time of exercise are more favorable than the strike price, the holder can let the option expire 
and buy the underlying asset on the market. In letting the option expire, the option holder 
foregoes only the premium or the price of the option.  
The main intuition of real option valuation is applying the structure of financial options to real 
investment decisions. In the case of real options, instead of the option holder deciding whether 
to buy or sell an underlying asset, it is the manager deciding whether to perform an action 
(Luenberger, 1998). The use of real options allows managers to take uncertainty in future 
project profitability into account, more so than with the traditional NPV method. Before 
discussing real option valuation, it is useful to see the different types of real options potentially 
available to managers. The six main types, as defined by Trigeorgis (1993), are explained 
below in Table 3-1.  
Table 3-1: Real Options Types, Source: Trigeorgis (1993). 
Category Description  Application 
Defer The ability to wait to make an 
investment over a defined time 
horizon.  
 Natural resource extraction industries, 
real estate development, farming, etc.  
Default A generic project with a series of 
outlays, which consists of a 
construction stage and an 
operating stage. Each stage could 
be considered as an option on the 
value of the subsequent stages  
 All R&D intensive industries, 
particularly in pharmaceuticals, and 
long-term development projects, like 
infrastructure development.  
Scaling Depending on market conditions, 
the managers could expand 
production to take advantage of 
large demand or contract 
production. Additionally, the 
 Natural resources, such as mines, 
facilities and construction in cyclical 
industries, fashion industry, consumer 
good industry  
31 
manager could temporarily shut-
down and then re-start production  
Abandon If the market conditions decline 
severely, the manager could 
abandon the project and salvage 
what is left of the investment 
through resale 
 Capital-intensive industries, new 
product launch in uncertain markets.  
Switch 
(outputs or 
inputs) 
Dependent  on market conditions, 
the manager can change 
production outputs, or change 
production inputs for better 
profitability 
 Output shift: consumer goods, machine 
parts, etc. 
Input shifts: energy/power source, 
procurement  
Corporate 
Growth 
If the cash flow of an early project 
is lower than expected, corporate 
growth options open up a 
company’s future growth 
opportunities, namely with a new 
product, oil reserves, access to a 
new market, etc.  
 Infrastructure-based industries, like 
high-tech, R&D, multinational options, 
etc.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the option to switch an input is the focus. Slightly different from 
the explanation above, this option to switch provides the manager with the opportunity to 
investigate the economic viability of switching from one input to another, while still expecting 
positive future profits. In this particular application, the manager is considering electrical 
power from shore for power in comparison to the currently used gas-powered turbines.   
At the heart of any real option valuation is the uncertainty that will be modeled, for example 
the electricity, as in this thesis. Although future electricity prices are not known, if the current 
price, the price volatility and other cost factors are known, the price can be modeled using a 
probability tree, as seen below in Figure 3-1 (Copeland & Antikarov, 2005). Figure 3-1 
illustrates a binomial tree, which means that at each node, the price can either move upwards 
or downwards, with both probabilities equal to one. Typically, the factor of an upward 
movement is denoted by u, while the factor of a downward movement is denoted by d. Using 
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the probabilities of an upwards or downwards movement, plus the u and d factors, the binomial 
tree can be easily calculated. This tree will then be used in finding the present value of the 
project at each node, represented below by the black dots at each intersection, just like with 
options.  
 
Figure 3-1: Example of probability tree construction. (Own illustration) 
Then the present value at each of the nodes can be used to find the project’s NPV at each of 
the nodes, which can be compared to the traditional NPV. Dependent on the node’s NPV, the 
manager can decide either to invest, if the node NPV is greater than the initial NPV, or defer 
investment, if the node NPV is less than the initial NPV. The tree approach also allows the 
manager to find the “threshold” price, or the price at which the manager is indifferent between 
investing and deferring (Copeland & Antikarov, 2005).  
The probability tree method is the most basic method for incorporating uncertainty into 
investment decisions. More sophisticated methods for modeling the chosen uncertain element 
include using a stochastic process, such as a Geometric Brownian Motion (hereafter, GBM) 
or a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. This thesis implements a stochastic process 
for the uncertain future electricity prices.   
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3.3 Data Analysis  
As mentioned in the previous section, this thesis employs a stochastic process to model the 
uncertain electricity price. The first step is to analyze the historical wholesale electricity prices 
to determine the appropriate process, either GBM or Ornstein-Uhlenbeck.3   
3.3.1 Geometric Brownian Motion  
A GBM can also be described as a random walk with drift and its general form is expressed 
below in Equation (1):  
 𝑑𝑥 =  𝛼 𝑥 𝑑𝑡 +  𝜎 𝑥 𝑑𝑧 (1) 
In this case, the change in the examined variable can be characterized by a constant drift term, 
α, a constant variance term, σ, and a Wiener increment process, dz. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
put forth three characteristics of GBMs and any Wiener processes that are important to their 
understanding:  
 First, these processes are also Markov processes, which means that the probability 
distribution for all future values of the process depends only on the current value 
 Second, the process has independent increments, meaning the probability distribution 
for the change in the process over any time interval is independent of any other time 
interval, so long as they do not overlap.  
 Last, changes in the process over any finite time interval are normally distributed, 
with a variance that linearly increases over the time interval.  
Following the third characteristic, the percent changes in x, Δx/x, are normally distributed. 
Because the percent changes are changes in the natural log of x, absolute changes in x, Δx, are 
log normally distributed (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). By examining the relationship between x 
and its logarithm, the mean and the variance can be found. Using the GBM general form in 
Equation (1) above, F(x) = log(x) can be expressed as a Brownian motion with drift: 
                                                 
3 There are many other stochastic processes used in commodity price modelling, however, given the scope and intention of 
this thesis, only the GBM and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes are considered. The GBM and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process are 
considered since they are the most commonly used processes in relevant literature.  
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𝑑𝐹 = (𝛼 −  
1
2
𝜎2) 𝑑𝑡 +  𝜎𝑑𝑧 (2) 
with mean of  (𝛼 −  
1
2
𝜎2) 𝑡 and variance of 𝜎2𝑡.  
3.3.2 Mean-Reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process 
An alternative process to the GBM is the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, a simplified mean 
reverting process. A main property of the OU process is a steady mean that the data oscillates 
around. In continuous time, the geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process takes the following 
general form:  
 𝑑𝑃 =  𝜂𝑃(?̅? −  𝑃)𝑑𝑡 +  𝜎𝑃𝑑𝑧 (3) 
As with the GBM, this thesis uses the discretized form of this process, which translates to:  
 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
=  𝜂(?̅? −  𝑃𝑡)Δ𝑡 +  𝜎𝜀𝑡√Δ𝑡 (4) 
Although no formal test is used to determine the appropriateness of the mean-reverting model, 
many economists, including Insley (2002) and Metcalf & Hassett (1995), maintain that a 
mean-reverting process is more appropriate for minerals and other raw commodities, citing 
that the prices tend to return to a mean in the long-term. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) claim that 
mean reversion is a product of the tendency of long-term prices to move closely around the 
marginal cost of production. Additionally, some GBM properties, like increasing without 
bound, do not fit well with modelling commodities prices, due to the external effects of supply 
and demand. If prices were to increase without bound, then firms would most likely increase 
investment to expand, however, in equilibrium, the supply shift would lead to a fall in price, 
due to downward sloping demand curves (Metcalf & Hassett, 1995).  
Based on the works of Insley (2002), Detert & Kotani (2013), and Metcalf & Hassett (1995), 
among others, as well as the economic intuition, the thesis implements a mean-reverting 
Ornstein Uhlenbeck process, as described above, as the stochastic process for wholesale 
electricity prices.  
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3.4 Parameter Estimation 
After determination of the appropriate price process, the parameters, primarily the mean 
reversion rate and the volatility, must be estimated. Using Equation (4) from the previous 
section, a regression equation is formed to estimate these parameters.  
 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
=  𝑐(1) + 𝑐(2)𝑃𝑡−1 +  𝑒𝑡 (5) 
where 𝑐(1) =  𝜂?̅?Δ𝑡, 𝑐(2) =  −𝜂Δ𝑡, and 𝑒𝑡 =  𝜎𝜀𝑡√Δ𝑡. Here, η is the mean reversion rate, 
and σ is the volatility. Equation (5) is then used in a regression with historical monthly crude 
electricity prices. The resulting c(1) and c(2) estimates are then used to calculate the long-run 
mean, ?̅?, the mean reversion rate, η, and the volatility, σ using the following formulas (Detert 
& Kotani, 2013):  
 𝜂 =  
−𝑐(2)
Δ𝑡
 (6) 
 ?̅? =  
− 𝑐(1)
𝑐(2)
 (7) 
 𝜎 =  
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑒𝑡)
√Δ𝑡
 (8) 
Once the parameters are calculated, the estimated Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process can be used to 
model potential future price diffusions, given an initial price point. The price diffusions are 
then used in the next step of determining the functional form of the profit function and the 
NPV calculations for the two alternative power generation solutions.  
3.5 NPV Calculation 
3.5.1 Profit Function 
Before the NPVs of the two alternatives, gas turbines and PFS, can be calculated, first, each 
of the profit functions for the respective solutions must be defined. The two profit functions 
are quite similar, sharing the same revenue stream. The main difference lies in the cost of 
power generation under the expenditure stream. While the gas-powered turbine solution’s 
costs include emission fees for the carbon emitted, the PFS solution’s costs include the cost of 
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electricity transported to the platform. Below, Equations (9) and (10)Feil! Fant ikke 
referansekilden. present the profit functions, before tax, for the gas-powered turbine solution 
and the PFS solution, respectively. Only the revenue section of the profit function is time 
dependent. The variables associated with the operating expenditures remain constant or time-
independent for the purposes of simplifying the necessary modelling. The individual variables 
are then further elaborated on.   
 𝜋𝐺,𝑡 =  𝑃𝑜 ∗ 𝑄𝑡 − (𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝐸 ∗ 𝐵) (9) 
 𝜋𝑃,𝑡 =  𝑃𝑜 ∗ 𝑄𝑡 −  (𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝑃𝐸𝐿,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀) (10) 
Where:  
 𝑃𝑜: average annual oil price, with three possible regions: low, medium and high 
 𝑄𝑡: annual quantity of oil extracted at time t 
 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋: sum of approximate operating expenditures, excluding power generation costs  
 𝐸: annual carbon fees  
 𝐵: annual carbon emissions 
 𝑃𝐸𝐿,𝑡: estimated wholesale electricity price for the operators, realized by the mean-
reverting stochastic process 
 𝑀: annual amount of electricity required by the platform 
 
Production Profile 
The annual quantity of oil is found by finding the production profile for the Edvard Grieg field. 
The production profile is the approximate distribution of annual extraction over the field’s 
estimated lifetime. Since the Edvard Grieg field is not yet in production, a similar field already 
in production is chosen to estimate the production profile in this case. The strategy chosen to 
estimate the production profile is the Hubbert Curve. Under the Hubbert Curve, annual 
production follows approximately a bell-shaped function of time and is a function of 
cumulative production. Specifically, the relationship is as such:  
 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑟𝑄𝑡 (1 −  
𝑄𝑡
𝐾
) 
   
(11) 
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Since annual production can also be seen as the change in cumulative production over time, 
Equation (11) can be re-written like so:  
 
𝑞𝑡 =
𝑑𝑄𝑡
𝑑𝑡
=  𝑟𝑄𝑡 (1 −  
𝑄𝑡
𝐾
) (12) 
This relationship leads to:  
 
𝑄𝑡
𝐾 − 𝑄𝑡
=  𝑒𝑟𝑡+𝑐0 (13) 
 𝑄𝑡 =  
𝐾𝑒𝑐0
𝑒𝑐0 + 𝑒−𝑟𝑡
 (14) 
 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑡→∞
𝑄𝑡 =  
𝐾𝑒𝑐0
𝑒𝑐0
= 𝐾 (15) 
Equations (13), (14) and (15) illustrate how the Hubbert Curve connects the three different 
factors, qt, annual production, Qt, cumulative production, and K, initial economic reserves and 
sets up the foundation for production profile estimation.  
In order to estimate parameters, observations for annual production, qt, are needed. From the 
observations of qt, the corresponding Qt, cumulative production values can be computed. By 
transforming Equation (11), the quadratic regression equation with no intercept is as follows:  
 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑟𝑄𝑡 −
𝑟
𝐾
𝑄𝑡
2     
(16) 
From the regression, both r and K can be found. The coefficient on the Qt term is the value for 
r, while K can be found by setting the 𝑄𝑡
2 coefficient equal to −
𝑟
𝐾
 and solving for K. After 
determining r and K, a base year for the estimation is chosen to be set to year zero, giving the 
value of the constant 𝑒𝑐0 term, 𝑒𝑐0 =  
𝑄𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝐾− 𝑄𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
 as seen from Equation (13)Feil! Fant ikke 
referansekilden.. Equation (17) uses the estimated r, K, and, 𝑒𝑐0, to both forecast and 
“hindcast” values of Qt.  
 
𝑄𝑡 =  
𝐾𝑒𝑐0
𝑒𝑐0 + 𝑒−𝑟(𝑡−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)
 (17) 
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Additionally, the corresponding values of qt can be calculated using Equation (11). This allows 
for an estimated production profile for an un-developed field, by using the production data 
from a similar field already in production.  
Carbon Emissions 
As stated previously, under the gas turbine solution, the main power generation cost is 
comprised of taxes paid on carbon emissions from the gas-turbine generators. The carbon 
emissions are relatively straightforward to calculate, requiring the heat rate for the generators, 
a carbon factor, and the power load. Since most of these values are given in differing units, 
they need to be converted, requiring only a few calculations. The heat rate is converted from 
Btu/KWh to sm3/GWh, the CO2 factor stays as is, and the power load is converted into energy, 
from MW to GWh. The annual carbon emissions amount typically expressed as a function of 
annual production, because the level of production would dictate the level of energy-
intensiveness required for extraction, hence dictating the amount of emissions. However, in 
this case, the average annual energy demand is used in the analysis so that energy requirement 
is kept as a constant and the emissions are calculated from there.  
Power Requirement 
The annual energy requirement for the Edvard Grieg platform is the average energy needed 
for the platform’s operations each year. In the PFS solution, the load required is necessary to 
the profit calculations because the electricity must be purchased from the on-land grid, before 
being sent via the subsea cable to the platform. Again, a relatively simple conversion is 
required, from the energy load in MW to the power requirement in GWh. This is calculated 
by multiplying the load by the number of hours in a year in order to find the power.   
Operating Expenditures  
The operating expenditures (hereafter, OPEX) include all the annual costs associated with the 
operation and maintenance of the Edvard Grieg platform. Normally, this would include the 
power generation costs, but, as mentioned above, in this case, the power generation costs are 
considered separately, since they are different in the two profit functions.  
Taxes  
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Table 3-2: Breakdown of the tax base calculation in Norway. Source: 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2012).  
+ Operating Income 
- Operating costs ( including search costs)  
- 
Depreciation (linear over 6 years from investment for production installations 
and pipelines  
- 
Exploration expenses, R&D, incurred plugging & abandonment (P&A) and 
removal  
- Allocated financial costs 
= General Income Tax Base (28%)  
- Uplift (7.5% of investment for 4 years)  
= Special Tax Base (50%)  
 
Because Edvard Grieg is a field on the NCS, Norwegian law and its petroleum tax system 
govern its operators and their actions. All of the profits made by both Lundin and Statoil are 
subject to the Norwegian Petroleum Taxation System. The taxation system is comprised of 
two parts, the general corporate tax and the special petroleum tax. Table 3-2 illustrates the 
general calculation method for the general income tax base, as well as the special tax base.  
 
3.5.2 NPV  
Using the profit functions, as defined above, the NPV for the two different solutions can be 
found using the known electricity price. NPVG and NPVP represent the NPV for the gas turbine 
and PFS solution, respectively. The NPV formula makes use of the profit function after it is 
subjected to the Norwegian tax system. In order to simplify the formula in the paper, the 
character  represents the effect of taxes on the profit function, including tax deductions. The 
adjusted NPV formulas for both solutions are as follows:  
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𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐺 = ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝐺,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
=  ∑ 𝜌𝑡𝜉𝜋𝐺,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 (18) 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝐺,𝑡
7
𝑡=0
+ ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝑃,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=8
−  𝜌8𝐼
=  ∑ 𝜌𝑡𝜉𝜋𝐺,𝑡
7
𝑡=0
+ ∑ 𝜌𝑡𝜉𝜋𝑃,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=8
− 𝜌8𝐼 
(19) 
In Equation (18), NPVG is equal to the summation of the present values of the gas turbine 
solution in each timer period up until the terminal time period T. In both NPV calculations,  
is the discount factor, which is equal to 
1
(1+𝑟)
, with r being the discount rate. In Equation (19), 
the NPV for the PFS solution, there is both the gas-turbine profit function and the PFS profit 
function, because the option to switch to the PFS solution occurs only after the seventh year, 
2023, when the Johan Sverdrup installation has the capacity to supply power. Additionally, 
there is the one-time investment cost from installing the cable from Johan Sverdrup to Edvard 
Grieg.  
3.6 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Because a mean-reverting stochastic process governs the electricity price in the NPV 
calculations, the expected values for the NPV must be estimated through Monte Carlo 
simulations. This creates the transition matrix necessary for the final dynamic programming 
portion of the analysis. The first step in the process is the generation of a vector of possible 
electricity price realizations using the mean-reverting stochastic process from t = 0 to t = T. 
Specifically, Equation (3), using the discretized specification from Equation (4), is used as the 
underlying price generating process. Next, using the price realization vector and an initial price 
condition,𝑃𝑜,0, the present values are summed according to 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐺 = ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝐺,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0  and 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃 =
 ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝐺,𝑡
7
𝑡=0 +  ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝑃,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=8 − 𝜌
8𝐼. This process is repeated a sufficiently large number of times, 
J, to approximate the expected NPV estimation at each initial price node i by taking the 
average of 𝐸(𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐺,𝑡|𝑃𝑜,0) ≈  
1
𝐽
∑ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐺,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1  and 𝐸(𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃,𝑡|𝑃𝑜,0) ≈  
1
𝐽
∑ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 . This 
process is repeated to find the NV at each of the terminal period price nodes. The terminal 
period price nodes range from 𝑃𝐸𝐿,0 = 0 to 𝑃𝐸𝐿,0 = 1000, with steps of 10. This serves as the 
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foundation for the dynamic optimization to take place in the dynamic programming section of 
the model. 
3.7 Dynamic Programming 
The dynamic programming approach is inspired by Detert & Kotani (2013), who consider a 
similar real options problem when analyzing renewable energy investments in Mongolia. In 
this case, there is an option to switch from a coal-based energy infrastructure or to switch to a 
renewable energy-based infrastructure. The dynamic programming process is similar to 
valuation technique for American call options, using backward recursion from the terminal 
nodes to the initial node. The main intuition behind dynamic programming is to split the 
decision sequence into two parts: the immediate period and the whole continuation beyond 
that (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Three major characteristics of dynamic programming are the 
state and control variables, xt and ut, and the outcome or expected NPV, Vt(xt). The state 
variable describes the current state of the cash flows in time t. Although the current state 
variable is known, all future values are random numbers, in this case, following the chosen 
mean-reverting stochastic process. The control variable represents the choice available to the 
firm, in this case, the choice to switch power generation solutions. Due to the two options 
available to the firm, the control variable takes on a binary nature, ut = {0,1}. The outcome 
represents the expected NPV, resulting from the chosen policies. The objective in dynamic 
programming is to choose the sequence of controls over time to maximize the expected NPV 
of the profits (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).  
In this thesis, the state variable is the wholesale electricity price, which will dictate the optimal 
value and policy function from the analysis. Although dynamic programming problems are 
typically characterized as profit-maximization problems, this particular problem could be seen 
as a cost minimization problem. Namely, what is the optimal value and policy for minimizing 
the project’s operating costs, given the two alternative power generation options.   
3.7.1 Bellman Optimality 
The main principle behind the dynamic programming technique is the solution of Bellman’s 
Principle of Optimality, which states:  
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“An optimal policy has the property that, whatever the initial action, the remaining choices 
constitute an optimal policy with respect to the sub problem starting at the state that results 
from the initial actions (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).”  
Turning back to the previous section, the foundation of dynamic programming is to split the 
decision sequence into two parts, the immediate period and the whole continuation beyond 
that. Focusing now on the immediate period, when the manager chooses control variable ut, 
they receive πt(xt,ut) immediately. Next, the continuation value must be found. In the next 
period, t+1, the state will be xt+1, yielding the outcome of Vt+1(xt+1). As mentioned previously, 
the current state is known, but the future values are random, requiring the expectation of the 
outcome, Et[Vt+1(xt+1)]. This expectation is the continuation value. The resulting value, 
summing the immediate payoff and the discounted continuation value, yields:  
 𝜋𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑢𝑡) +  𝜌𝐸𝑡[𝑉𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1)] (20) 
Equation (20) represents the value that the manager will want to maximize. Since the control 
variable, ut, is the manager’s choice, he will maximize this expression with respect to ut, 
yielding the Bellman equation:  
 𝑉𝑡(𝑥𝑡) =  max
𝑢𝑡
{𝜋𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑢𝑡) + 𝜌𝐸𝑡[𝑉𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1)]} (21) 
Returning to the Problem Formulation, this thesis models the problem as an American call 
option, and this problem implements the Bellman equation to work backwards from the 
terminal period, T, to find the initial value. In this case, the Bellman equation is formulated as 
such:  
 𝑉𝑇−1(𝑥𝑇−1) =  max
𝑢𝑡
{𝜋(𝑥𝑇−1, 𝑢𝑇−1) + 𝜌𝐸𝑇−1[Ω𝑇(𝑥𝑡)]} (22) 
In Equation (22), Ω𝑇(𝑥𝑡) is the termination payoff, or the amount that the firm will get at the 
end of the period. Using the simulated expected NPVs from the Monte Carlo simulations, the 
value of the previous period can be calculated and continued from T-1, to T-2, etc. all the way 
back to the initial period, t = 0.  
In this application, the Bellman equation, Equation (22), must be modified to represent the 
optimal stopping or switching problem this thesis presents. The resulting equation is:  
 𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{Ω(𝑥), 𝜋(𝑥) + 𝜌𝐸[𝑉(𝑥′|𝑥)]} (23) 
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Equation (23) represents the choice between taking the termination payoff from the initial state 
versus continuing. In our case, the choice is between continuing with the initial power 
generation system or switching to the PFS system, which would represent the left and right 
terms of the right-hand side of Equation (23), respectively. The optimal conditions for 
switching will be evaluated for this problem by evaluating Equation (23), the Bellman 
equation, at every period. While there are different strategies for solving the Bellman equation, 
this thesis implements value function iteration as the basis for its analysis.  
3.7.2 Value Function Iteration 
The parts necessary for solving the dynamic optimization problem are the value function, the 
vector of possible states, and a transition matrix determining the probability of switching 
states. The value function is taken from Equation (23), the modified Bellman Equation. The 
vector of possible states, in this case, is the vector of NPVs, calculated from the simulated 
electricity price realizations. The transition matrix is constructed in a relatively simplifier 
manner, using Monte Carlo Sampling and Sample Average Approximation Method, assigning 
an equal probability to each state, equal to 𝑙 =  1 𝐽⁄ , with J being the number of simulation 
iterations. More advanced probability estimation methods are outside the scope of this thesis.  
The value function iteration, as described by Judd (1998) works as follows. First, a grid of 
possible values of the state, the electricity price, po,t, is created, with N elements. Next, an 
initial guess for the value function, V0(po,t), is made, a N x 1 vector, representing each possible 
state. V1(po,t) can be computing, substituting V
0 into the value function. After finding V1(po,t), 
it is compared with V0(po,t). If the two values are not sufficiently close enough, the iteration 
process is repeated, substituting V1(po,t) into the value function for V
2(po,t). On the n
th iteration, 
both Vn(po,t) and V
n-1(po,t) will be known. For a large enough n, the values should be sufficiently 
close. This results in a value function over the electricity prices, which allows one to 
investigate the trigger prices for switching power generation solutions.  
 
  
 
44 
4. Model 
4.1 Data Collection 
The required data for this analysis is a historical time series of wholesale electricity prices, 
properties for production profile estimation, estimated initial capital expenditures for the 
project, estimates for annual operating expenditures for both solutions, total annual carbon 
emission fee for gas turbine solution (both the Norwegian government and the EU ETS), 
estimated annual emissions for gas turbine solution, the expected electricity price for the PFS 
solution, the expected power requirement for the PFS solution, the switch cost, and the 
discount rate. The wholesale electricity prices are monthly electricity prices in Euro from 
January 1, 2000 to April 1, 2014, obtained from NordPool Spot. Since the dataset is originally 
in Euro per megawatt-hour, it is converted into Norwegian kroner using average monthly 
exchange rates from the Norwegian Central Bank, starting in January 2000. Figure 4-1 below 
shows the historical price path of the electricity prices in NOK over the 13-year sample.  
 
Figure 4-1: Monthly Wholesale Electricity Prices, converted to NOK, using 
average monthly exchange rates. Source: Nord Pool Spot (2013).  
Before moving on to the other data required, it is important to state the uncertain nature of 
these values. Most cost and operation information surrounding projects under development is 
highly uncertain and what the operators/developers know is proprietary information, to which 
this thesis did not have access. That being said, there are a few reports published through NPD 
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and the MPE and other consultancies, namely, the Report on Electrification of the Middle 
North Sea from 2012, which give an insight into what baseline values should be considered. 
 The production profile of a yet to be developed field is unknown, however, an approximate 
production profile is estimated for Edvard Grieg using the Hubbert Curve on a similar field in 
the North Sea, Oseberg Øst. Oseberg Øst has been in production since 1999 and had similar 
original reserves of barrels of oil equivalent to those estimated for Edvard Grieg. Edvard Grieg 
is estimated to have 185.8 million barrels oil equivalent, while Oseberg Øst started originally 
with 167.7 million (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013). The discrepancy 
between the exact amounts could lead to an underestimation of the production rate. The annual 
production information for Oseberg Øst from 1999 to 2014 (using 1999 as the base year) is 
used to estimate the approximate values of r and K needed to estimate Qt. Because the 
approximate initial recoverable reserves are known for Edvard Grieg, this value is substituted 
for the estimated K, in the attempt to mitigate some of the under-estimation. With these 
parameters, Edvard Grieg’s production profile can be estimated over its expected 30-year 
lifetime, shown below in Figure 4-2. The full production profile estimated can be found in 
Appendix 2.  
 
Figure 4-2: Edvard Grieg Production Profile, estimated from Oseberg Øst 
production data. Source: own calculations, data: Oljedirektoratet (2013).  
 
The estimated capital expenditures are taken from the Edvard Grieg operator, Lundin, who 
reported an estimated CAPEX or 24 billion NOK. The annual operating costs of each solution 
are estimated based on the opinions of industry experts and published reports.  
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The data specific to the gas turbine solution are the annual carbon emission fees and annual 
carbon emissions. The annual carbon emission fee is the combination of what must be paid to 
the Norwegian government as well as the EU ETS. These fee amounts are sourced from the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and Point Carbon and are 410 NOK per ton of CO2 emitted 
and approximately 50 NOK per ton CO2 under the ETS for Norway and the ETS, respectively. 
This comes to a total fee of 460 NOK per ton CO2. The annual estimated emissions from the 
gas turbines are calculated using the heat rate and efficiency for the specific generators used 
on the Edvard Grieg platform, the GE LM2500+, as well as the average annual power 
requirement. The LM2500+ technical specifications are sourced from the GE data sheet, 
yielding a thermal efficiency of 38%, which indicates a heat rate of 8,856 btu/Kwh or 242,906 
sm3/GWh. The energy requirement for the Edvard Grieg platform and connected Ivar Åsen 
field is estimated to 50 MW, implying an annual power demand of 438 GWh (add energy, 
2012). Using the heat rate and annual power demand, as well as a CO2 factor of 2.4 
kilograms/sm3, the estimated annual carbon emissions in is 255 million kilograms or 283,715 
tons CO2.  
The data specific to the PFS solution is the annual power requirement and the electricity price 
paid by the operator for on-shore electricity from the grid. Operators, being large power 
consumers, are eligible for wholesale prices. As mentioned in the background, operators 
typically implement a portfolio of spot prices and long-term contracts for electricity 
procurement. However, for simplification of the model, the average wholesale electricity price 
of 290 NOK/MWh, as reported by the Norwegian Statistical Bureau, is used. Since the main 
units in this analysis are GWh, the converted price is 260,000 NOK/GWh. Taking the annual 
power requirement used in the gas turbine data, 438 GWh, this yields an annual electricity cost 
of approximately 127 million NOK. Additionally, the PFS solution, if chosen, requires a one-
time CAPEX cost of 200 million NOK for the procurement and installation of the subsea cable 
from Edvard Grieg field to the Johan Sverdrup field (add energy, 2012).  
 
4.2 Parameter Estimation 
Using the mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process chosen from the Statistical Analysis 
section previously, the parameters estimated for the price process are as follows:  
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Level, ?̅? 322.07 
Speed, η 0.0179 
Sigma, σ 0.248 
 With these parameters, the estimated process for the future crude electricity price realizations 
is 
𝑃𝐸𝐿,𝑡−𝑃𝐸𝐿,𝑡−1
𝑃𝐸𝐿,𝑡−1
=  0.0179(322.07 −  𝑃𝐸𝐿,𝑡)Δ𝑡 +  0.248𝜀𝑡√Δ𝑡. This process is used to simulate 
the future path for the crude electricity price in this analysis. Figure 4-3 below displays a visual 
representation of 1000 price path simulations in the period, from 2015 to 2046.  
 
Figure 4-3: 1000 Wholesale Electricity Price Realizations 
As can be seen in Figure 4-3 above, the simulated price paths have a high volatility, ranging 
roughly from 0 to 550 NOK/MWh, but there is a clear tendency to revert to the estimated mean 
price level around 322 NOK/MWh. These price simulations are used later in calculating the 
expected terminal NPV values for the different solutions. Something to note from the 
simulated prices is the apparent smoothing that occurs through the simulation. The historical 
prices seen on left-hand side of the plotted line exhibit consistent spikes in the prices, with 
very short intervals between the high peaks and the low peaks. Conversely, the simulated 
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prices on the right-hand side of the plotted line do not follow this same nature. This most likely 
occurs from the one-factor stochastic model, which focuses primarily on the long-term mean 
level and the overall volatility. Also, since the spikes do not seem to endure any significant 
period of time (i.e. longer than one year), such spikes would not have the greatest weight in 
terms of long-term decision making.  
4.3 NPV Calculation  
Before moving on to the dynamic optimization, first, the standard NPV for each solution is 
calculated. This calculation is relatively simple and executed in Excel (see Appendix 1 for 
Excel sheet). For the gas turbine solution, the NPV at the end of the field lifetime, 23 years, is 
NOK 4.369 billion. The NPV at the end of the field lifetime for the PFS solution, with an 
immediate switch to PFS in 2021, is NOK 4.34 billion. At first glance, it is clear that switching 
to the PFS solution, although profitable, still loses out to the traditional gas turbine solution. 
Below, Table 4-1 summarizes the changes in the NPV of the different solutions, both in the 
baseline case and in varying parameter value cases.  
Table 4-1: Traditional NPV calculations under differing key parameter 
values  
Scenario NPV – Gas Turbines NPV – PFS  
Baseline  4.369 billion NOK 4.343 billion NOK  
15% Decrease Oil Price  2.463 billion NOK 2.436 billion NOK  
15% Increase Oil Price  6.276 billion NOK  6.249 billion NOK  
15% Decrease Electricity 
Price 
4.369 billion NOK  4.373 billion NOK  
15% Increase Electricity 
Price 
4.369 billion NOK  4.312 billion NOK  
15% Decrease Carbon Tax 4.423 billion NOK  4.366 billion NOK  
15% Increase Carbon Tax  4.316 billion NOK  4.319 billion NOK 
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One important thing to note when examining Table 4-1 is how the NPV changes due to a 
change in a parameter. Concerning the oil price, the optimal solution does not change, simply 
the amount of money changes. This is logical because in this thesis’ case, cost minimization 
is most important, and oil prices affect only the revenues, which is identical in the two cases. 
The final two parameters examined are the electricity price and the carbon tax, which are 
critical to this cost-minimization analysis. As can be seen, a 15% decrease in the electricity 
price results in the PFS solution becoming the optimal solution, whereas the 15% increase 
keeps the gas turbine solution optimal. The opposite goes for changes in the carbon price, 
which affects primarily the gas turbine solution, becoming more profitable when the carbon 
price decreases and less profitable and no longer optimal, when the carbon price increases. 
One difference, however, is that the carbon price does affect the PFS NPV as well, since the 
first years of the PFS case does involve a gas turbine. These NPV calculations serve as the 
basis for the Monte Carlo simulation for the terminal values used in the dynamic optimization. 
4.4 Dynamic Programming Results  
4.4.1 Baseline Model 
The baseline model implements the parameters set forth in the preceding calculations and 
estimations. As mentioned previously, the baseline case, over a 23-year time horizon, has a 
set oil price of 500 NOK/bbl, a simulated wholesale electricity price, a set annual OPEX of 
400 million NOK, and an annual carbon tax of 460 NOK/ton. Under these baseline conditions, 
the dynamic programming model strives to find the optimal conditions for the implementation 
of a PFS solution over a gas turbine solution. Given the rigidity of the MATLAB model used, 
a finite discrete dynamic programming solver from the CompEcon Toolbox, created by Paul 
Fackler and Mario Miranda (2011), some parameters, such as the oil price and production, 
were held constant. Figure 4-4 displays the estimated optimal project values with the 
corresponding wholesale electricity prices.  
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Figure 4-4: Optimal Project Value Function  
As can be seen, with increasing electricity prices, the project value decreases steadily, until 
the point where the electricity price reaches around 295 NOK/MWh. This breakpoint, where 
the project value levels off at roughly 3.6 billion NOK, indicates the threshold point where it 
is optimal rather to stay with gas turbine generators instead of switching to PFS. This can also 
be illustrated with the plot of the optimal policy function, Figure 4-5 below, which is even 
more telling. In the optimal policy function, y = 2 dictates that the PFS solution is the optimal 
solution, whereas, y = 1 is to stay with traditional gas turbines. Again, it is clear that the critical 
electricity price is at 295 NOK/MWh, as seen in the optimal value function above.  
150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650
3.6
3.61
3.62
3.63
3.64
3.65
3.66
3.67
3.68
x 10
9
Electricity Price (NOK/MWh)
V
a
lu
e
 (
N
O
K
)
51 
Figure 4-5: Optimal Policy Function Illustration 
Figures 4-4 and 4-5 depict that the critical or breakeven electricity price is 295 NOK/MWh. 
This would be the point at which the manager should be indifferent between staying with the 
gas turbine and switching to PFS. Looking back at the simulated prices earlier in this section, 
this price is below the long-term average of 322 NOK/MWh, which could call into question 
the feasibility of reaching a stable point where this electricity price is available long-term. This 
low threshold electricity price mirrors the sentiment in the industry that PFS can be too 
expensive over the lifetime, especially if electricity prices are as volatile as seen. It is important 
to reiterate that this is the optimal policy in the case when just the electricity price is examined. 
That being said, the next section examines the sensitivity of the baseline model with respect 
to its key parameters (oil price and OPEX), and takes an in-depth look at the particular effect 
of carbon taxes.  
4.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis  
Upon receiving the results from the baseline model, it is important to examine how these 
results change due to changes in some of the model parameters. The parameters changed in 
the sensitivity analysis are the oil price and the annual OPEX. Figure 4-6 illustrates the 
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changes that occur to the baseline model given a 15% increase or decrease to either the oil 
price or the annual OPEX, holding all other parameters constant.  
 As Figure 4-6 shows, changes in either the oil price or annual OPEX do not result in a change 
to the threshold wholesale electricity prices, but rather a change in the range of expected 
project values, as indicated by the y-axis. What is interesting to note, is the relative 
insensitivity of the project value to changes in the annual OPEX, as opposed to changes in the 
oil price. Either a 15% decrease or increase in the oil price results in a value difference of 
around half a billion NOK, whereas the change in OPEX results only in a value difference of 
10 million or so.  
It is expected that this sensitivity analysis does not change the threshold electricity price 
because these two parameters do not affect the two major components of this problem, cost of 
electricity for PFS and carbon tax payouts for gas-powered turbines. The next section 
addresses the effects of future carbon tax levels on the threshold wholesale electricity price.  
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Figure 4-6: Results of Sensitivity Analysis to Baseline Model 
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4.4.3 Carbon Emission Tax  
As an extension of the previous sensitivity analysis, the effects of changes in the carbon tax 
are examined. The baseline total carbon tax is 460 NOK/ton emitted CO2 and this sensitivity 
analysis will examine 10% and 25% increases in this total tax and the corresponding effects 
on the estimated project value. Additionally, the “critical” carbon tax will be found, the tax 
high enough such that it eliminates the incentive to use gas turbine power generation.  This 
thesis looks at carbon emission taxes separately from the general sensitivity analysis because 
the carbon emission tax is a critical factor in this analysis, alongside the wholesale electricity 
prices. Only increases in the carbon emission tax are examined because of the political and 
social climate calling for increases to carbon taxes to incentivize polluters to use more 
environmentally friendly technologies. Lastly, a 15% and 25% increase in the carbon prices is 
examined due to carbon price estimates from an Ernst and Young report, The future of global 
carbon markets (2012), citing that prices in Phase 3 could range from €10 – €25 (NOK 82 – 
NOK 205), citing roughly a 15% and 25% increase in total carbon prices (both Norwegian and 
EU ETS), respectively (Ernst & Young, 2012).  
 
Figure 4-7: Optimal Value Functions Under the Differing Carbon Prices  
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10% Increase  
A 10% increase in the total carbon tax would bring the tax to 506 NOK/ton CO2. With a 10% 
increase in the carbon tax, the critical electricity price increases to roughly 320 NOK/MWh, 
as seen above in Figure 4-7. This increase in the threshold price is to be expected since the 
increased carbon tax only increases the costs to the gas turbine solution, allowing for a wider 
range for which the PFS solution has lower OPEX costs. This threshold price, in comparison 
to the baseline model results, is 25 NOK higher and much closer to the long-term mean level 
found in the electricity price model. Another interesting change is the range of estimated 
project values. When comparing the value ranges in Figure 4-7, both the baseline and the 10% 
carbon increase have the same maximum value at 3.67 billion NOK, but the 10% carbon 
increase line bottoms out around 3.595 billion NOK, as opposed to around 3.61 billion NOK 
for the baseline case. This again is a reasonable effect, since the carbon tax increase affects 
only the gas turbine solution, which represents the lower bound of the optimal value function.  
25% Increase 
With a 25% increase in the total carbon price, equaling a total carbon price of 575 NOK/ton, 
the effects are much the same as the 10% increase, however with a much larger effect. As seen 
above in Figure 4-7, the critical electricity price increases further to around 360 NOK/MWh, 
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Figure 4-8: Optimal Policy Function under the differing Carbon Prices  
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reaching a point higher than the modeled long-term mean electricity price. This would indicate 
that with carbon prices at this level, there could be long-term economic potential for a PFS 
solution. Once again, the lower bound on the value function drops, this time to a level of 3.57 
billion NOK.    
Critical Carbon Tax 
The critical carbon tax is the tax in this analysis, which eliminates the gas turbine option from 
the optimal solution. As shown by the light blue line in Figure 4-7 there is no threshold point 
at which gas turbines would be optimal over PFS. In the previous cases, each of the value 
functions bottomed out once the threshold price was reached, however, within this set of 
electricity prices, that point is not reached. In this case, the critical carbon tax is found to be 
approximately 1,003 NOK/ton of CO2. To reiterate, this is the total critical carbon tax, 
meaning the tax for the operator from both the Norwegian government and the ETS. If the 
recently increased Norwegian carbon tax were to stay the same over this period, that would 
mean the ETS permit price would have to increase from 50 NOK/ton to 593 NOK/ton, and 
increase of approximately 1100%, which in the current climate is not likely.  
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5. Discussion 
The results from both the baseline model and the carbon tax scenarios confirm some expected 
consequences and uncover some difficulties for the feasibility of a PFS solution for the Edvard 
Grieg field, as well as some general insights for any upcoming field on the NCS. The initial 
findings for the Edvard Grieg field indicate that a PFS solution is possible within the indicated 
threshold electricity prices for the different scenarios. Furthermore, these threshold prices 
become increasingly more favorable towards PFS when coupled with increasing carbon taxes, 
either from the Norwegian state or the ETS.  However, there are many current issues connected 
to the Norwegian wholesale electricity prices and carbon taxes, outside the scope of this thesis, 
which play a large role in shaping the optimal conditions for implementation of PFS at Edvard 
Grieg and generally on the NCS.  
First and foremost, the results from the standard NPV calculation and the dynamic 
programming are quite different. That is not completely unexpected, given the simplifications 
made to the model in order to implement the chosen dynamic programming technique. That 
being said, the real option approach presents its user more than an “invest or do not invest” 
answer but rather a set of conditions, from which one can make better informed decisions 
based on new information or intuition. From the NPV calculations for the two solutions, the 
gas turbine solution has the higher NPV, which would motivate its user to shelve the idea of 
switching to PFS. Conversely, the real options analysis creates boundaries for the optimal 
policy, depending on realized electricity prices and carbon taxes in the future, providing the 
user with a more comprehensive picture of the project’s potential value.  
The rough threshold electricity prices found for implementing a PFS solution at Edvard Grieg 
range from 295 NOK/MWh to 360 NOK/MWh, depending on the carbon tax level. 
Considering a current wholesale electricity price of 290 NOK/MWh, as mentioned in the 
background, it is reasonable to conclude that a PFS solution could be profitably executed at 
Edvard Grieg. In this thesis, the electricity price simulations yielded realizations from zero to 
600 NOK/MWh. As can be seen from the historical and simulated wholesale electricity prices, 
it is incredibly difficult to forecast accurately what future electricity prices will be; however, 
there are some factors, which can help determine the general trend in the short to medium run. 
As mentioned in the Background, all electricity for Edvard Grieg is to be sourced from the on-
shore grid in Southwest Norway, an area that is already struggling with mounting security of 
supply issues. Although it is outside of the scope of this thesis to examine the growth of 
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electricity demand for both onshore and offshore consumers, a more rigorous investigation of 
this problem could look into the growth of supply and demand, alongside the priorities 
assigned to each by the responsible parties. For example, with the grid in Rogaland facing 
supply issues, and increasing household demand and industrial demand offshore, who is the 
consumer of first choice and how will that affect the wholesale prices and even availability of 
electricity to the offshore platforms? Additionally, the electricity price is, in this thesis, 
modelled by a one-factor mean-reverting stochastic process, which forces mean reversion in 
the medium to long run. Further investigations into this topic could benefit from implementing 
a more sophisticated approach to modelling the prices to attempt to capture more of the 
behavior than achieved in this particular case.  
In addition to the wholesale electricity prices, carbon taxes play, as expected, a major role in 
the viability of a PFS solution, or rather the non-viability of the traditional gas turbine 
approach. As seen in the changes from the baseline to the increased carbon tax scenarios, there 
are significant gains for PFS with increasing carbon taxes. However, even though there are 
significant gains for PFS with a 10-25% increase in carbon taxes, in this case, the critical total 
carbon tax of 1003 NOK/ton is more than 218% higher than the current total carbon tax of 460 
NOK/ton. Currently, Norwegian carbon taxes comprise 410 NOK/ton of the total, with the 
ETS comprising only 50 NOK/ton. Unlike Norwegian electricity prices, the total carbon tax 
is a bit easier to forecast accurately, since it is determined through a combination of policy and 
market forces. Norway already leads the world with regards to its high standards for carbon 
taxation, so it is unreasonable to propose that major changes in the total carbon tax should 
come from the ETS. However, given the depressed state of the ETS carbon permit market, any 
significant increases in the short to medium term seem unlikely. That being said, the current 
framework for the ETS system runs only through 2020, only four years into this analysis. 
Although the fate of the ETS after Phase 3 has not been widely discussed, it can be expected 
that further freezes on permit auctions as well as cap cuts will help push carbon prices to much 
more effective levels. Further research can be done could be done to better quantify the value 
of decreased emissions, either from the societal view, by increased environmental quality and 
amenity or from the operator view, by positive reputational benefits.  
In addition to the two major factors, the electricity price and carbon taxes, looking forward, 
there are other concerns for the practicality of these findings. In this analysis, there is a single 
type of gas turbine generator considered, the LTE-2500+, which is installed on the Edvard 
Grieg platform. This particular generator operates at a thermal efficiency of only 38%, 
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translating to high emissions levels. This allows a PFS solution with no emissions and low 
losses (up to 10%), to compete on OPEX costs, depending on the cost of electricity. With 
increasing technological advances, particularly within the areas of turbine fuel efficiency, the 
value of being able to switch to PFS could be diminished, especially if one of the main cost 
drivers for the gas turbine solution, carbon taxes, could be decreased significantly compared 
to the main cost driver for PFS, electricity price.  
Alongside the economic concerns against implementing PFS, there are also claims that PFS 
will have little positive effect on the climate. As mentioned previously, electrifying offshore 
oil installations puts large demands on the onshore grid, which may not have the capacity to 
supply such demands. This would require electricity import from mainland Europe. One of 
the major incentives of PFS in Norway is that the power would be supplied through clean 
hydropower. However, if electricity needs to be imported from Europe, that electricity would 
come from dirtier power generation methods, such as coal power plants (Ramsdal, 2014). In 
this case, PFS would improve the carbon footprint on the NCS and in Norway, but globally, 
there would be little improvement.  
Working within the limited scope of this thesis, there does appear to be a margin, albeit thin, 
for the implementation of PFS at the Edvard Grieg field, given the produced wholesale 
electricity threshold prices and the current state of the oil industry. However, the thin margin 
coupled with the already large uncertainty inherent in the industry makes one believe that 
concrete long-term changes, potentially in the form of a more stable electricity supply or 
effectively higher carbon taxes, are necessary for PFS to actually be implemented at Edvard 
Grieg or in future NCS field developments.  
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6. Conclusion  
The Norwegian government and the oil operators have been at odds over the electrification of 
the Utsira High since the discovery of Johan Sverdrup in 2010. The electrification of the area 
would stand to save Norway over a million tons of carbon emissions per year, however, the 
operators are hit with the high cost of supplying the platforms with electrical power from 
shore. Despite the efforts made by the Norwegian government to discourage carbon emissions 
offshore, mainly through their above average carbon emission tax, the traditional gas turbine 
solution is preferred by operators, due to its ease and relatively lower CAPEX.  
However, the findings in this thesis can show that there is the possibility for a PFS solution at 
the Edvard Grieg field. When looking at the main cost differentials between the two solutions: 
the electricity prices for PFS and the carbon taxes for gas turbines, there are conditions, which 
allow for a PFS solution. With current carbon taxes, the approximate threshold electricity price 
for PFS is 295 NOK/MWh, five NOK higher than current contract prices. Furthermore, the 
threshold prices increase substantially with additional help from higher carbon taxes, through 
either the Norwegian government or the ETS. This indicates that there is hope in implementing 
a PFS solution at Edvard Grieg and possibly at other field developments on the NCS.  
These findings, however, must be taken with caution given the nature of the industry and the 
limitations of the model implemented. The petroleum industry is wrought with uncertainty, 
which requires all to take these findings as merely relative terms and not the absolute truths. 
Given the complexity of the problem and the limitations of the author, the model was forced 
to hold many parameters, such as the revenues, constant, impairing the ability of the model to 
capture the entirety of the problem. However, this work does set the stage for further research 
regarding the optimal conditions for PFS implementation, making use of more sophisticated 
techniques to include more of the parameter dynamics that were not dealt with here.   
Despite these shortcomings, the findings in this thesis do provide an illustration of the ability 
of PFS to be a viable power generation option for the Edvard Grieg field. There are many 
additional factors, such as commodity prices, domestic policy, energy demand, geopolitical 
conflict, etc., which may arise in the future and have a profound effect on the viability of either 
power generation option. Nevertheless, by incorporating flexibility their perspective, the 
operator will have a clearer picture of the options, which await them.  
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